Ravi Zacharias on Atheism
“A man rejects God neither because of intellectual demands nor because of the scarcity of evidence. A man rejects God because of a moral resistance that refuses to admit his need for God.”
- Ravi Zacharias
“A man rejects God neither because of intellectual demands nor because of the scarcity of evidence. A man rejects God because of a moral resistance that refuses to admit his need for God.”
- Ravi Zacharias
smijer
on April 16th, 2009
I hear Ravi Z on the radio sometimes. I enjoy his program. For an apologist he is pretty sophisticated. I have to say that he is more of an authority on his own response to God than he is on my response to the notions of God people try to teach to me. I reject those stories for a scarcity of evidence…. He missed that one.
rogermorris
on April 17th, 2009
Thanks for your comments. You state that you reject notions of God due to ‘scarcity of evidence’. Zacharias and others such as Sproul, Hugh Ross, William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland and Gary Habermas would argue that the evidence for the existence of God within ourselves, within our relations to others, within the natural world and within the cosmos is overwhelming for anyone who would search with intellectual honesty and integrity.
R.C. Sproul (see my previous post) and others remind us that the Bible states that is it not for a lack of evidence that people reject the notion of God. Rather the rejection of God comes from a deep seated (often subconscious) rejection of the concept of transcendent Divine authority over our thoughts, preferences and actions.
For every person who rejects the notion of God for rational, evidential reasons, many more reject God’s existence for emotional, irrational and psychological reasons – the rejection of the notion of authoritarian father, rejection of the moral accountabilities of Christian theism, rejection of the perceived threat to individual autonomy, the problem of evil and rejection of the idea of scrutiny and eventual judgment by a holy, just, all-knowing and all-powerful God.
If you were being honest (particularly with yourself) what is the truthful, basic reason that you reject the notion of God?
Regards, Roger.
smijer
on April 17th, 2009
You know, I am not in a position to speak for others who reject notions of God. I know that I have seen expressions from some that express concerns over the notions of Divine Authority as it is formulated in many religious doctrines. Certainly Socrates pointed out the difficulty of Divine Command theory in his dialog with Euthyphro. In fact, I do share some of these concerns. But belief in a truth claim about the real world – that there objectively exists a God is settled for me on the question of objective evidence.
When you say that evidence exists “within ourselves”, I can only assume you are speaking of subjective experience. Unfortunately, subjective experience has never proven to be a useful guide to objective fact. I cannot see how evidence “within ourselves” can help establish the existence of God. At most, I can imagine that we interpret certain casts of mind as indicative of God being “in our heart”. If you define God as the promptings of the human heart, then perhaps that’s evidence. If you define God in the traditional way, though, there is no way to distinguish God’s action from our own emotional responses.
The same can be said about “evidence” within our relationships with others. I am a Unitarian Universalist, and my minister likes to speak of God as metaphorically “bringing people together to create something” (as in a relationship). I understand this imagery, though I prefer a more prosaic expression of the importance of interpersonal relationships. But unless you define God in a very non-traditional way – as the love between people, for instance – these relationships do not provide anything in the way of evidence.
I have heard numerous apologists, including many of those you mention, claim to find evidence in the natural world or in the cosmos for God. But I have yet to see them present any objective evidence that actually favored the God hypothesis (traditionally defined), and I find no explanatory power in the versions of that hypothesis that are put forward by them. I’m skeptical of their ability to present any.
So, the basic reason that I reject the notion of God is that no one who presents that notion has shown me a way that I can confirm it, or even shown me that they have confirmed it themselves except for subjectively.
I have no problem with subjective notions of God, the Holy, the Sacred or what have you. But it is important to distinguish subjective notions from objective facts…. And I think there is a lot of confusion on that point.
rogermorris
on April 17th, 2009
Thanks again for your interesting comments.
While subjective experience is an important, if not vital, aspect of an authentic Christian faith (through the inner witness of the Holy Spirit) that is not what I was talking about when I suggested that there was evidence of the existence of God ‘within ourselves’. By this comment, I mean human attributes such as self-consciousness, desire for transcendent meaning, appeal to objective moral absolutes (right & wrong), and, in terms of our interpersonal relationships, the concept of love between people. In my mind, none of these internal human attributes are adequately explained by atheistic naturalism, even if one was to appeal to survival advantage via natural selection. In fact, my opinion is that concepts such as right & wrong, transcendent meaning and love are completely meaningless in the atheistic naturalist worldview. They serve no meaningful purpose. And yet I take it that you would complain if someone stole your car or swindled money from you, and I assume there are significant people in your life for whom you feel love.
I find it intriguing that although you identify yourself as a unitarian universalist, what you reveal in your comments is more in line with naturalism and empiricism. While I understand the diversity of personal belief within the UU movement, I find it curious why you feel the need to be involved in a spiritual organisation such as UU in the first place. Could it be that you are trying to fulfill a subconscious desire for transcendent meaning in your world that is not adequately satisfied by your naturalistic empiricism?
Kins regards, Roger.
smijer
on April 18th, 2009
Well, you know there are more facets to human existence than discovering what is objectively true. I am a materialist in the philosophical sense that I do not believe non-naturalistic methods are reliable for discovering objective truth. I’m a UU because I find in it a wonderful synthesis of ethical and aesthetic thinking, and because the community is a home to me. In a modern world where individuals and families are often isolated, I am thankful for a chance to commune with others without having to match epistemology with them.
I’m not sure if you were interested in engaging on the subject of “objective” or “universal” moral values. If you were, I’ll give you my thoughts in brief: those moral values that are “universally shared” among humans a) have adaptive value for humans, b) are shared among other animals, especially primates and other mammals, only to the extent that they have adaptive value and are consistent with the intellectual capacity of those organisms, and are absent in nature apart from their existence as adaptive features of social animals. Therefore, I see them as a product of our evolutionary history. If they were somehow created and meant to embody absolute good and evil, I would expect them to be universally expressed even in non-living matter. Moral values that are not “universally” shared among humans, I think, are best explained as cultural responses to social organization.
Bruno
on April 18th, 2009
Hi, can I jump in here?
Let me see if I understand you correctly, morals that are “universal” can be identified by their adaptive value relative to the intellectual capacity of an organism.
While I can understand how morals may have adaptive value, I don’t see how adaptive value necessarilly implies morals e.g. controversial sociobiological theories of rape. that suggest rape has adaptive value.
Also how can non-adaptive behaviour be classified as morally wrong even if it does lead to extinction? Extinction is after all just an evolutionary fact, not morally wrong.
To say that something is morally wrong requires an absolute standard and a transcendent judge.
smijer
on April 18th, 2009
Bruno – I think you’re reading me backward. I’m starting with universal values, and observing about them that they have adaptive value for humans, and where the same values seem to be recognized by other animals, that they have adaptive value there. I’m not starting with adaptive value and stating about it that it makes a moral value absolute. So, while rape may, in some cases, carry a net adaptive value for the propagation of certain genes (i.e. it may be a working reproductive strategy), that doesn’t imply it is morally sound. On the other hand, among moral values that are universally recognized among humans, we can find adaptive benefit. In other words, it may be that a moral value so deeply ingrained that all but the mentally diseased carry it can be explained as a product of human evolution – because such a moral value is so highly adaptive that all healthy individual humans are strongly genetically predisposed to a frame of mind that recognizes it. Other moral values – those that are not “universal” – likely have a smaller biological component, and a larger sociological component.
A note I failed to mention before…. I may well be wrong in my thinking on the origin of moral values. If I fail to explain them, that doesn’t automatically make them evidence of God. Unless a coherent case can be made that the God hypothesis falsifiably predicts (not just “explains”) these values, then their status as evidence for God remains very weak. As skeptics are fond of saying – the existence of the “unexplained” is evidence for a lack of explanation – not evidence for a desired explanation.
Bruno
on April 18th, 2009
Ok, thanks for the clarification. These universal values, are they something like Platonic ideals?
If this is case then it may solve the need for an objective standard, but we would still be lacking a transcendent judge. Only a transcendent judge is impartial enough to correctly interpret and apply ‘universal values”. Left to ourselves, us humans are stuck with the problem of identifying these universal values, let alone applying them. We can only fallback to relative morality for all practical purposes.
While Popperian falsificationism does have a lot of value when testing theoretical explanations of the physical regularities of nature, I don’t see how even in principle it is applicable to ethics. Could you elaborate on what you meant?
smijer
on April 18th, 2009
I’m in no way a platonist. I simply observe, along with Roger that certain moral values are held universally by all humans not afflicted with mental illness, regardless of culture. Where he and I differ is on how this fact can be explained.
It certainly would be nice to have a transcendent judge who is impartial and wise enough to adjudicate moral law. Unfortunately, we must resort to political systems for adjudication in this world.
I do not think that ethics are addressed by Popperian philosophy of science. Falsification comes in not with our mode of ethics, but with proposed explanations for the *origin* of ethics. Roger mentions Christian apologists who say that human recognition ethical principles implies the existence of God (that is, such recognition is evidence for God). I disagree. One reason for my disagreement is that such a proposition isn’t testable. Without being testable their proposed explanation for the cause of ethics has little value as evidence for God.
rogermorris
on April 18th, 2009
“One reason for my disagreement is that such a proposition isn’t testable. Without being testable their proposed explanation for the cause of ethics has little value as evidence for God.”
Isn’t that just old fashioned Logical Positivism? Logical Positivism unfortunately cannot be tested or verified empircally and is therefore self-refuting.
smijer
on April 19th, 2009
If I remember correctly, logical positivism holds that only what is directly observed truly exists. My contention is that hypotheses must be testable if we are to determine whether they constitute good explanations for what we observe. I don’t think the two are the same.