Between Dawkins & God

When Dawkin’s claims, in a clearly unqualified way, that ‘religion is harmful’, this assumes we have identified what is and is not a religion. It assumes we can know when religion is a cause, and when an effect of social phenomena. It takes as read that, with minimal dialogue with religious believers, we are in a position to understand their faith and practice.

Dawkins also implies that, although failing to engage with either ethical or cultural theory, he is in a position to make and proclaim accurate ethical and cultural judgements to a very wide audience. On the face of it, Dawkins seems in these respects to have hardly begun to ask some basic relevant questions. Instead, he comes across as wishing to reach conclusions without a careful consideration of evidence and argument — and this just happens to be one of his loudest criticisms of religion itself.

I feel more sympathetic towards Dawkins’ other claim, that religious belief is a matter of blind faith, and that living by unjustified faith is unwise and to be avoided. Once again, however, this is a simplistic generalisation — easy to digest so long as critical reflection is not allowed to impede the smug satisfaction that comes from thinking that one has understood what one has not studied or personally known.

 

(John Holroyd. Between Dawkins & God, Philosophy Now (Issue 86, Sep/Oct 2011), p.31)