Morality and the Brain
From the Philosophy Bites Podcast:
David Eagleman on Morality and the Brain
Should recent discoveries about the brain change our attitude to moral responsibility and culpability? In this episode of the Philosophy Bites podcast neuroscientist David Eagleman argues that it should.
David Eagleman is a neuroscientist and a writer. He directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law at Baylor College of Medicine. He is best known for his work on time perception, synesthesia, and neurolaw. At night he writes. His work of fiction, SUM, is an international bestseller published in 23 languages. His book on the internet and civilization, Why the Net Matters, is available as an app for the iPad and as an eBook. His latest book, Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain, explores the neuroscience “under the hood” of the conscious mind–that is, all the aspects of neural function to which we have no awareness or access.
Listen to the podcast episode here.
Roger’s comments:
See, this is why most scientists make rotten philosophers, and even worse moral philosophers.
It is easy to see what will happen to civilized society if scientism and scientistic scientists are allowed to dictate our anthropology and morality, unchecked and unregulated by philosophers and theologians. The prospects are frightening.
Dr Eagleman makes a fuzzy reference to the study of the man who blamed his paedophilia tendencies on his frontal lobe tumour. Anyone with knowledge about frontal lobe tumours and frontal lobe syndrome will know that pathology in this area causes disinhibition and accentuation of previously present tendencies. What we are not told is what this man was like pre-morbidly. Isn’t it possible that the man already has paedophilia tendencies prior to his tumour and that the ensuing frontal lobe syndrome merely disinhibited him to the point where his tendencies became simply more obvious and more brazen? We do not know, but for Dr Eagleman to assume that the paeophilia tendencies in this man could simply be reduced on this basis to a neurobiological anomaly is a hugely unwarranted leap in assumption. And I expect his enthusiasm for this model would be sorely tested if it was his own child who was subjected to sexual abuse from this man.
Of course in the legal system, it is not simply “a brain in front of the bench” (a pathetic example of reductive neuroscientist hubris). It is a WHOLE PERSON in front of the bench – Alva Noe ( Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness) and many others remind us that while the brain is a necessary element of what make a conscious being, it is certainly not a sufficient element in our total understanding of sentience and personhood.
Nancy Murphy has an important contribution to make to this discussion in her book Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?:
See what happens when we let scientists loose in the areas of anthropology, philosophy and morality? When need to take note and take precautions.
Steve
on June 2nd, 2011
If the man with pedophilic tendencies acts them out because his frontal lobe tumors disinhibit him from doing so, then the tumors may not be responsible for the tendencies themselves, but they ARE responsible for his actions and, therefore, exculpatory. And even if Dr. Eagleman would no longer argue this if his own child were molested, it would be fallacious to argue that this disproves his argument.
rogermorris
on June 2nd, 2011
Steve, methinks you are splitting hairs. You would make an excellent defence lawyer. How could you make a distinction scientifically and legally that the tumours in the frontal lobe where in any way related to his paedophilic behaviour anyway, apart from flimsy circumstantial association? How could you PROVE beyond reasonable doubt that the tumours, and not the person, were responsible for the criminal behaviour?
It may be that my appeal to intuition and existential repugnance does not disprove Dr Eagleman’s claim, but the tests of existential liveability and intuition are important filter through which to pass any worldview claim prior to accepting it.
Steve
on June 2nd, 2011
Roger, it seems to me that Christian apologists are, by necessity, the real “hair-splitters” and defense lawyer material.
In the USA’s legal system, it is not the defense’s burden to prove the defendant’s innocence beyond a reasonable doubt but the prosecution’s burden to prove his guilt to that degree. And I think that if strong neuroscientific evidence were adduced showing that frontal lobe tumors disinhibit impulses that might otherwise be resisted, that could certainly cast reasonable doubt on a defendant’s culpability unless we’re going to start sentencing people for crimes they only DESIRE to commit. Do you think people should be punished for their mere desires?
rogermorris
on June 2nd, 2011
In Australia one can be prosecuted for ‘conspiracy to murder’, if it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt that someone ‘desired’, in the form of making plans, to murder someone. I am not a lawyer, but I believe there are manners in which people can be prosecuted for ‘conspiring’ to break other laws as well. So, I guess the concept of convicting people on the grounds of their intentions and desires, even if not acted on, already happens – at least in the Australian legal system. And our system is not all that different from the US.
The matter of free will has not been settled by any means as yet – certainly not as confidently as physicalist neuroscientists crow about. The concept of top down causation and true, rather than illusory, free will is still supported by philosophers such as Nancy Murphy, who is a non-reductive physicalist. This discussion is far from over.
Steve
on June 2nd, 2011
Roger, again, it seems unjust to punish anyone for what they merely desire to do so long as they don’t act out that desire, and unjust to punish anyone for acting out a desire that they couldn’t help but act out. I can see using evidence of desire to commit illegal activity as corroborating the allegation that someone actually carried out that desire.
For instance, if someone were on trial for rape, the prosecution could present evidence showing that the defendant subscribed to websites depicting simulated acts of rape, or that he had written stories about committing rape. But someone could not be charged with merely thinking about rape or being turned on by fantasies of it. These are not illiegal activities, nor, in my opinion, should they be.
To me, it seems overwhelmingly evident that if free will is uncaused will, there is no such thing. Even “top down causation” is still, by definition, caused will. And caused will of any kind–bottom up and/or top down–is will that is inevitably caused by given interacting physical, biological, psychological, social, and cultural conditions.