Patricia Churchland on Neuroscience & Morality
Brain Science Podcast Episode 81 marks the return of philosopher Patricia Churchland, who was first interviewed back in Episode 55. This conversation with BSP host Dr Ginger Campbell focuses on her latest book, Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. We discuss the historical background and contrast Churchland’s approach to that of Sam Harris in The Moral Landscape. Then Professor Churchland discusses how recent discoveries in neuroscience are shedding light on the evolutionary origins of morality.
Listen to the podcast discussion here.
Roger’s comment:
As Churchland is supposedly such a luminary in the field of moral philosophy, it was disappointing that a lay person such as myself could detect the basic error in her description of the moral argument for the existence of God as utilised by Christian moral philosophers. More specifically, what I refer to is the claim that only God, as described by Christian theology, can form the ontological basis of objective morality.
To be clear, the claim made in this respect is NOT that morality in an individual is contingent on that person having a belief in God – particularly in a personal, transcendent, holy and just God. That is NOT the claim made by Christian philosophers.
The ontological basis premise of the moral argument for God is that if a transcendent, personal, holy and just God like the God of the Christian faith (who embodies by His very nature the gold standard of all that is good, right, just and holy) does not exist, than there is no ontological or existential basis for objective morality. In the absence of such a God, there is no objective basis and standard by which to judge right/wrong, good/bad, just/unjust.
This is not contingent of the belief of an individual, but stands objectively outside individual opinion, and transcends the particular beliefs each and every individual.
So in the example of the Buddhist, the Confuscianist, the Taoist and in fact the atheist, any display of moral behaviour (and there are undoubtedly frequent and common examples of this) reflects a deep-seated echo of an innate human intuitive understanding of basic moral premises that reflect the image of God (imago Dei) that is imprinted in every human being (and neural wiring is no doubt a large part of this). John Calvin called this the ‘sensis divinitatus’ – the innate sense of the divine and associated objective moral truths.
For further exploration — “Can We Be Good Without God” – William Lane Craig
Steve
on February 3rd, 2012
Roger, I confess that I don’t understand what it means to say that God “embodies by His very nature the gold standard of all that is good” if He IS that gold standard other than that He embodies Himself. And this seems pointlessly tautological. That is, unless there is some standard of goodness beyond God that God happens to embody, then good is simply what God is and does, even if it were commanding parents to rape, torture, and murder their children.
On the other hand, if good is, as Sam Harris argues, what promotes the well-being of humanity or, more broadly, that of the biosphere, then, whether or not we believe in the Christian or any other “God,” we have the most compelling basis for an “objective morality.”
rogermorris
on February 3rd, 2012
Steve,
What you recycle is the well-trodden Euthyphro’s Dilemma – that either “good” is what God arbitrarily commands (whether that be helping an old lady across the street, or murdering and dismembering a small child for pleasure) or “good” is concept outside, transcendent and higher than God, that He simply assents to and adopts.
This is a false dilemma. A third option is simply that “good” is an inherent and innate attribute of God that He neither arbitrarily decides, nor adopts from a higher transcendent source. It is an irreducible attribute of God, along with holiness, justice, mercy, compassion, etc. Therefore “Good” would never include murdering a child for pleasure, because this is completely insoluble with the innate attributes of God.
http://www.faithinterface.com.au/apologetics/euthyphros-dilemma
http://www.faithinterface.com.au/apologetics/euthyphros-lament-answered-by-philosopher
Steve
on February 4th, 2012
Roger, I don’t think I was merely “recycling” the Euthyphro argument. I was also saying that I don’t understand how your so-called “third option” really circumvents the “dilemma” you aptly describe. How so?
Because to say that ““good” is an inherent and innate attribute of God that He neither arbitrarily decides, nor adopts from a higher transcendent source” doesn’t seem to me to really mean anything other than that God is God no matter what He is and does. That is, if there’s no standard of goodness external to God by which we can judge God’s actions or alleged actions, what else can “good” mean other than what God is or does, and how would that exclude His “murdering a child for pleasure”? If He were to do this or command us to do it, what basis would we have for saying it was evil or even that He wouldn’t do it because He’s “good” when “good” means nothing more than what God is and does?